At ACISP 2004, Huang and Wang first introduced the concept of convertible nominative signatures and also proposed a concrete scheme. However, it was pointed out by many works that Huang-Wang's scheme is in fact not a nominative signature. In this paper, we first present a security model for convertible nominative signatures. The properties of Unforgeability, Invisibility, Non-impersonation and Nonrepudiation in the setting of convertible nominative signatures are defined formally. Then we modify Huang-Wang's scheme into a secure one. Formal proofs are provided to show that the modified Huang-Wang's scheme satisfies all the security properties under some conventional assumptions in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Digital signature, introduced by Diffie and Hellman [3] , is a cryptographic means through which the authenticity, data integrity and non-repudiation can be verified. Standard digital signatures have the property that anyone can check whether an alleged message-signature pair is valid or not with respect to a given public key. This publicly verifiable property is necessarily required for some applications of digital signatures such as official announcements. However, this may not be a desired property in some applications, where message to be authenticated are personally private or commercially sensitive. To restrict the public verifiability, some kinds of digital signatures have been proposed, such as nominative signatures (NS).
The concept of nominative signatures was due to Kim, Park and Won [7] . A nominative signature scheme allow a nominative A (i.e. the signer) and a nominee B (i.e. the verifier) to jointly generate a signature σ so that the validity of σ can only be verified by B. Furthermore, if σ is valid, B can convince a third party C of the validity of σ using confirmation protocol; otherwise, B can convince a third party C of the invalidity of σ using disavowal protocol. As suggested in [5, [7] [8] [9] , nominative signatures have potential applications in the scenarios where a signed message is personally private or commercially sensitive, such as a tax bill, a medical examination report, ID certification system.
At ACISP 2004, Huang and Wang [5] first added the "convertible" property to nominative signatures, and introduced the concept of convertible nominative signatures (CNS). Moreover, they proposed a concrete scheme based on Kim et al.'s nominative signature scheme [7] . Their scheme enables the nominee to convert a nominative signature into a publicly verifiable one, if necessary.
Unfortunately, in [4, 10, 11] , it was found that HuangWang's scheme is not nominative in fact. Specially, the nominator in Huang-Wang's scheme can verify the validity of a nominative signature and also show to anyone that the nominative signature is indeed a valid one without the help of the nominee. Hence, Huang-Wang's scheme fails to meet the crucial security requirements of nominative signature: invisibility and non-impersonation.
In this paper, we first give a formal security model of convertible nominative signatures. In the model, the security properties of convertible nominative signatures include Unforgeability, Invisibility, Non-impersonation and Non-repudiation. Then we modify Huang-Wang's scheme to make it satisfy all the properties. Moreover, formal security analysis is provided to show that the modified scheme is provably secure under some standard assumptions in the random oracle model [1] .
Preliminaries
Let p, q be large primes that satisfy q|p − 1, and g be an element in Z * p with order q. Let H : {0, 1} * → Z q be a public secure hash function. Hereafter, we will use the notation a ∈ R A to mean that a is chosen randomly from A and use the symbol to mean concatenation.
Intractability Problems
The following three problems are assumed to be hard for any polynomial time algorithm. 
Signature of Equality
Following signature of equality [2] will be used in our convertible nominative signature scheme to convert given nominative signatures into publicly verifiable ones.
A pair (c, s) satisfying c=H(g h y z g s y c h s z c m) is signature of equality of the discrete logarithm of y with respect to the base g and the discrete logarithm of z with respect to the base h for the message m and is denoted by SEQDL(g, h, y, z, m).
A SEQDL(g, h, y, z, m) can only be computed if the secret key x = log g y = log h z is known, by choosing k ∈ R Z * q , and computing c and s according to
Definition and Security Model of CNS
We will denote by A, B and C the nominator, the nominee, and the verifier (a third party) throughout the paper.
Definition of CNS
The convertible nominative signature scheme consists of the following algorithms and protocols:
• System Setup: a probabilistic algorithm that on input 1 k where k ∈ N is a security parameter, generates the common parameters denoted by cp.
• Key Generation: a probabilistic algorithm that on input cp, generates a public/private key pair (pk, sk) for a user in the system.
• Signing Protocol: an interactive (or non-interactive) algorithm. The common inputs of A and B are cp and a message m. A has an additional input pk B , indicating that A nominates B as the nominee; and B has an additional input pk A , indicating that A is the nominator. At the end of the protocol, either A or B outputs a convertible nominative signature σ, or ⊥ indicating the failure of the protocol.
• Ver nominee (nominee-only verification): a deterministic algorithm that on input the common parameters cp, a nominative message-signature pair (m, σ), A'public key pk A and B'private key sk B , returns valid or invalid.
• Confirmation/Disavowal Protocol: an interactive ( or non-interactive ) algorithm between B and C. On input the common parameters cp and (m, σ, pk A , pk B ), B sets a bit µ to 1 if valid ← Ver nominee (m, σ, pk A , sk B ); otherwise, µ is set to 0. B first sends µ to C. If µ = 1, Confirmation protocol is carried out; otherwise, Disavowal protocol is carried out. At the end of the protocol, C outputs either accept or reject while B has no output.
• Selectively Convert: a probabilistic (or deterministic) algorithm that on input the common parameters cp, the public/private key pair (pk B , sk B ), A'public key pk A and a valid message-signature pair (m, σ), outputs a selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B of the given messagesignature pair.
• Selectively Verify: a deterministic algorithm that on input the common parameters cp, the public keys pk A and pk B , the message-signature pair (m, σ) and the selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B , outputs accept or reject.
Correctness: Suppose that all the algorithms and protocols of a convertible nominative signature scheme are carried out accordingly by honest entities A, B and C, then the scheme is said to satisfy the correctness requirement if
2. C outputs accept at the end of Confirmation protocol;
3. On input (m, σ) together with a valid selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B , Selectively Verify algorithm outputs accept.
Validity of a Convertible Nominative Signature: A convertible nominative signature σ is said to be valid on m with respect to pk A and pk B if valid ← Ver nominee (m, σ, pk A , sk B ) where sk B is the corresponding private key of pk B .
The security model of convertible nominative signature will be defined using the game between an adversary and a simulator. We allow the adversary F to access the following oracles and submit their queries to the simulator S adaptively:
• CreateUser Oracle: On input an identity, say I, it generates a key pair (pk I , sk I ) using Key Generation algorithm and returns pk I .
• Corrupt Oracle: On input a public key pk, if pk is generated by CreaterUser Oracle or in {pk A , pk B }, the corresponding private key is returned; otherwise, ⊥ is returned. pk is said to be corrupted.
• Signing Oracle: On input a message m, two distinct public keys pk 1 (the nominator) and pk 2 (the nominee) such that at least one of them is uncorrupted, and one parameter called role ∈ {nil, nominator, nominee},
-if role is nil, S simulates a run of Signing protocol and then returns a valid convertible nominative signature σ and a transcript of the execution of Signing protocol.
-If role is nominator, S (as nominee with public key pk 2 ) simulates a run of Signing protocol with F (as nominator with public key pk 1 ).
-If role is nominee, S (as nominator with public key pk 1 ) simulates a run of Signing protocol with F (as nominee with public key pk 2 ).
• Confirmation/Disavowal Oracle: On input a message m, a nominator signature σ and two public keys pk 1 (the nominator) and pk 2 (the nominee). Let sk 2 be the corresponding private key of pk 2 , the oracle responds based on whether a passive attack or an active/concurrent attack is mounted.
-In a passive attack, if Ver nominee (m, σ, pk 1 , sk 2 ) = valid, the oracle returns a bit µ = 1 and a transcript of Confirmation protocol. Otherwise, µ = 0 and a transcript of Disavowal protocol is returned.
-In an active/concurrent attack, if Ver nominee (m, σ, pk 1 , sk 2 )=valid, the oracle returns µ = 1 and executes Confirmation protocol with F (acting as a verifier). Otherwise, the oracle returns µ = 0 and executes Disavowal protocol with F. The difference between active and concurrent attack is that F interacts serially with the oracle in the active attack while F interacts with different instances of the oracle concurrently in the concurrent attack.
• Selectively Convert Oracle: On input a message m, a nominative signature σ and two public keys pk 1 (the nominator) and pk 2 (the nominee), it runs Selectively Convert algorithm to generate the selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B and returns it to F.
The security notions for convertible nominative signature include: Unforgeability, Invisibility, Non-impersonation and Non-repudiation. We will make detailed descriptions for them in the following subsections.
Unforgeability
The existential unforgeability means that an adversary should not be able to forge a valid convertible nominative signature if at least one of the private keys of A and B is not known. The adversary in our definition is allowed to access to the CreatUser Oracle, Corrupt Oracle, Signing Oracle and Confirmation/Disavowal Oracle. Furthermore, we also allow the adversary to submit queries to Selectively Convert Oracle. This is to ensure that the knowledge of the selective proof cannot help the adversary to forge a new valid message-signature pair. We divide the potential adversaries into the following three types: Adversary 0 who has only the public keys of the nominator A and the nominee B; Adversary I who has the public keys of the nominator A and the nominee B and also has B's private key; Adversary II who has the public keys of the nominator A and the nominee B and also has A's private key.
We can easily find that if a convertible nominative signature scheme is unforgeable against Adversary I (or Adversary II), then it is also unforgeable against Adversary 0. Game Unforgeability (Adversary I): Let S be the simulator and F I be the adversary.
(Initialization
is executed and key pairs (pk A , sk A ) and (pk B , sk B ) for nominator A and nominee B, respectively, are generated using Key Generation algorithm. F I is invoked with inputs 1 k , pk A , pk B .
2. (Attacking Phase) F I can make queries to the oracles mentioned above;
3. (Output Phase) F I outputs a pair (m * , σ * ).
F I wins the game if valid ← Ver nominee (m * , σ * , pk A , sk B ) and (1) F I has never corrupted pk A ; (2) (m * , pk A , pk B , role) has never been queried to Signing Oracle for any valid value of role. F I 's advantage in this game is defined to be Adv(F I ) = Pr [ F I wins ].
Game Unforgeability (Adversary II):
It is defined similarly to the above game. Specially, the descriptions of all phases are the same as the above game, so we omit them. When all phases are over, F II wins the game if valid ←Ver nominee (m * , σ * , pk A , sk B ) and (1) F II has never corrupted pk B ; (2) (m * , pk A , pk B , role) has never been queried to Signing Oracle for any valid value of role; (3) (m * , σ , pk A , pk B ) has never been queried to Confirmation/Disavowal Oracle for any convertible nominative signature σ with respect to pk A and pk B . F II 's advantage in this game is defined to be Adv(F II ) = Pr [ F II wins ].
Definition 1 A convertible nominative signature scheme is said to be existential unforgeable if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversaries F I and F II have a nonnegligible advantage in the above games.
Invisibility
We now extend the property invisibility for nominative signatures into the setting of convertible nominative signature. This property essentially means that it is impossible for an adversary to determine whether a given messagesignature pair (m, σ) is valid without the help of the nominee and the selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B . Game Invisibility: Let D be the simulator and D be the distinguisher.
(Initialization Phase)
The initialization phase is the same as that of Game Unforgeability.
(Preparation Phase)
The distinguisher D can adaptively access to all the oracles. At some point, D submits the challenge (m * , pk A , pk B , role) to Signing Oracle.
Then D (acting as nominator) will carry out a run of Signing protocol with the simulator D (acting as nominee). Let σ valid be the convertible nominative signature generated by the simulator D at the end of the protocol.
The challenge signature σ * is then generated based on the outcome of a random coin toss b. If b = 1, D sets σ * = σ valid . If b = 0, σ * is chosen uniformly at random from the signature space of the convertible nominative signature scheme with respect to pk A and pk B . Then the challenging signature σ * is returned to D. (1) pk B has never been submitted to Corrupt Oracle; (2) (m * , pk A , pk B , role) has never been submitted to Signing Oracle; (3) (m * , σ * , pk A , pk B ) has never been submitted to Selectively Convert Oracle; (4) (m * , σ , pk A , pk B ) has never been submitted to Confirmation/Disavowal Oracle for any convertible nominative signature σ on m * with respect to pk A and pk B . D'advantage in this game is defined to be
(Guessing
Definition 2 A convertible nominative signature scheme is said to have the property of invisibility if no PPT distinguisher D has a non-negligible advantage in the above game.
Non-impersonation
The notion of non-impersonation means that the validity of a nominative signature can only be determined by the help of the nominee, someone else including the nominator should not be able to show the validity of the nominative signature to a third party. Concretely, this notion requires that:
1. Only with the knowledge of the public key of the nominee B, it should be difficult for an impersonator I I to execute Confirmation/Disavowal protocol.
2. Only with the knowledge of the public key of the nominee B, it should be difficult for an impersonator I II to generate the selective proof for a message-signature pair.
Game Impersonation of Confirmation/Disavowal Protocol: Let S be the simulator and I I be the impersonator.
(Initialization Phase)
(Preparation Phase)
In this phase, impersonator I I is permitted to access all the oracles. I I prepares a triple (m * , σ * , µ) where m * is some message, σ * is a convertible nominative signature and µ is a bit. The impersonator I I wins the game if the simulator acting as the verifier outputs accept while I I has the following restrictions: I I has never submitted pk B to the Corrupt Oracle. I I 's advantage in this game is defined to be Adv(I I ) = Pr [ I I wins ]. Game Impersonation of Selectively Convert Algorithm: Let S be the simulator and I II be the impersonator.
(Initialization Phase)
(Preparation Phase)
The impersonator I II is invoked on input 1 k , pk A , pk B and permitted to issue queries to all the oracles.
(Impersonation Phase)
The impersonator I II outputs a valid selective proof P m * ,σ * pk A ,pk B for a messagesignature pair (m * , σ * ).
The impersonator I II wins the game if P m * ,σ * pk A ,pk B satisfies Selectively Verify algorithm but: (1) pk B has never been submitted to Corrupt Oracle; (2) (m * , σ * , pk A , pk B ) has never queries Selectively Convert Oracle. I II 's advantage in this game is defined to be Adv(I II ) = Pr [ I II wins ].
Definition 3 A convertible nominative signature scheme is said to be secure against impersonation if no PPT impersonators I I and I II have a non-negligible advantage in the above games.
Non-repudiation
The notion of non-repudiation requires that the nominee cannot convince a verifier C that a valid (invalid) convertible nominative signature is invalid (valid). Game Non-repudiation: Let S be the simulator and B be the cheating nominee.
(Initialization Phase)
(Preparation
where m * is some message and σ * is a nominative signature. Definition 4 A convertible nominative signature scheme is said to be secure against repudiation by nominee if no PPT cheating nominee B has a non-negligible advantage in the above game.
Modified Huang-Wang's CNS Scheme

Scheme
We now modify the Huang-Wang's convertible nominative signature scheme [5] into a secure one. The modified Huang-Wang's scheme is as follows.
• System Setup: Let p, q be two large primes such that q|p − 1, and g an element in Z * p of order q. Assume that the discrete logarithm problem in the group g is hard. In addition, two one-way hash functions H 1 : {0, 1} * → g and H 2 : {0, 1} * → Z q is publicly available.
• Key Generation: The nominator A and the nominee B set their public/private key pairs as (y A , x A ) and (y B , x B ) respectively, where x A , x B ∈ R Z * q , y A = g x A mod p and y B = g x B mod p.
• Signing Protocol: To generate a nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) for a message m, the nominator A and the nominee B jointly perform as follows.
1. The nominee B first picks R ∈ R Z * q , then sends (a, c) to the nominator A by computing
2. Upon receiving (a, c), the nominator A chooses r ∈ R Z * q , and sends (b, c, s ) to B by computing
3. Then nominee B checks whether both of the following equations hold:
If not, outputs "F alse". Otherwise, nominee B outputs σ = (b, c, s) as the nominative signature for message m by setting s = s + x B − R (mod q).
We say that σ = (b, c, s) is a convertible nominative signature ( i.e. σ is in the signature space with respect to pk A and pk B ) if b, c ∈ Z p , s ∈ Z q and g s y e A b ≡ y B mod p.
• Ver nominee : Given a nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) and a message m, the nominee B accepts σ as valid if and only if
• Confirmation/Disavowal Protocol: On input (m, σ, y A , y B ) where σ is a convertible nominative signature, if Ver nominee (m, σ, y A , x B ) = valid, B sends µ = 1 to verifier C; otherwise, µ = 0 is sent to C. B then proves to C that the tuple (g, y B , H 1 (m y A y B ), c) is a DH-tuple or not according to the value of u using WI protocols [6] .
• Selectively Convert: When the nominee B wants to convert a nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) into a publicly verifiable one, he chooses k ∈ R Z * q and computes the selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B as SEQDL(g, H 1 (m y A y B ), y B , c, σ) = (c , s )
• Selectively Verify: Anyone can verify the nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) with its selective proof P m, σ pk A ,pk B = (c , s ) by verifying the corresponding signature of equality SEQDL.
Remark. We say that (g, g u , g v , g w ) is a DH-tuple if w ≡ uv (mod q); otherwise, it is a non-DH-tuple. As shown in [6] , using WI protocol, a prover who knows the knowledge of either one of the witnesses, i.e. u or v, can prove that whether the tuple (g, g u , g v , g w ) is a DH-tuple or not. In Confirmation/Disavowal protocol of our scheme, B's knowledge is x B . We will use the WI protocol [6] for concrete implementation.
Security Analysis
We now analyze the security of our proposed scheme with respect to the security notions formalized in Sec.3.
Theorem 1
The modified Huang-Wang's convertible nominative signature scheme is existential unforgeable if both DLP and CDH problems are hard.
Theorem 2 The modified Huang-Wang's convertible nominative signature scheme has the property of invisibility if the DDH problem is hard.
Theorem 3
The modified Huang-Wang's convertible nominative signature scheme is secure against impersonation if DLP problem is hard.
Theorem 4
The modified Huang-Wang's convertible nominative signature scheme is secure against repudiation by nominee.
Due to the page limitation, the formal proofs of all the above theorems will be presented in the full version of this paper [12] .
Comparison
Compared with Huang-Wang's scheme, our scheme additionally employ a hash function in the signing protocol, so it is slightly less efficient. However it offers formal security analysis under a reasonable security model, while HuangWang's scheme is in fact not a secure scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper, we first presented a security model of convertible nominative signatures and then modified HuangWang's scheme to be secure in this model. Meanwhile, all the security properties of the modified Huang-Wang's scheme were formally proven under some conventional complexity assumptions in the random oracle model.
